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Habit as a Political  
Concept
The essays composing the monographic section of this issue of Concep-
tos Históricos result from a seminar that took place, in recent years, at the 
Doctoral School of the University of Padua. They are therefore driven 
by a common problem and by a common approach. For those who have 
been contributing to this work, the history of political concepts does not 
coincide with either the history of ideas or the history of words. What 
is at stake is rather the genealogy of modernity and, in particular, of the 
modern political form through the conceptual constellation that made 
the birth of the state possible.
This operation has to be understood in a twofold sense: on the one 
hand, it means accounting for the specificity of modern political ex-
perience, that is, of the revolutionary process that characterizes it as 
soon as concepts such as individual, will, decision, equality, sovereign 
political representation – literally unthinkable for ancient, medieval and 
pre-modern political thought – come into play as the foundation of the 
state; on the other hand, this is about attempting to take leave of the 
centrality of these concepts and to think beyond them, thus confronting 
the crisis that they have been undergoing in the contemporary age – an 
age that we may provisionally qualify as post-state or post-democratic.
In the latter case, it is a matter of removing the truth effect of modern 
bourgeois law, which takes the individual owner and her isolated will as 
the necessary parameter of subjectivity, in order to reactivate conceptual 
frameworks, categories and forms of thought that have been marginal-
ized within the archive of modern political philosophy. Key to such an 
archive is indeed the continuity of the notion of sovereignty, whether it 
is intended as the irrevocable self-disposition of the individual will or 
as the political translation of this same will into the universal will of the 
body politic. In virtue of this concept, what is also crucial is the pos-
sibility of defining and constituting the general legal and institutional 
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framework to which both individual and collective experience are to be 
reduced, starting precisely from a sovereign decision as well as from the 
formalizing caesura between practice and theory that it presupposes. 
A whole series of authors and proposals, before, inside and beyond the 
threshold produced by this shift, engage otherwise with the space of the 
relationship and the bond between the living.
For this reason, practicing the history of political concepts means, 
first and foremost, to not yield to the hypnotic effect of the conceptual 
framework of the state. For centuries, even in the midst of its trium-
phant parabola, politics was not understood, practiced or communicated 
as a space for recomposing intrinsically irreducible or conflicting indi-
vidualities. The concepts whereby modern law has codified the relations 
between subjects – and, even before this, established the sovereign will 
of the individual as the founding principle of legal subjectivity and as 
the key driving force for the formalization of equality between the sub-
jects of law – have monopolized and significantly narrowed the range 
of expression of the system of relationships and forms of interaction to 
which it is possible to refer when talking about politics. “Habit” and 
“custom” (decisive signifiers for ethics, politics and law, provided that 
they are not reduced to their modern formalization) are political con-
cepts that can be acknowledged to be pivotal for the circulation of an 
idea of practice and a practice of action which are literally untranslatable 
into the modern configuration of the Political.
Generally speaking, habit is a reiterative tendency of behavior con-
tracted through the repetition of acts. Whether it is gestures, practices, 
behaviors or ideas, habitual actions are those that we perform thought-
lessly and almost mechanically for having contracted them, precisely, as 
habits. Hence the legitimate suspicion that “habit” represents an obstacle 
to freedom and, because of the comfort that it gives us by weakening our 
curiosity, even to the practice of philosophy. Philosophy, however, has 
been long dealing with habit by trying to meditate on the constitutive 
duplicity that characterizes it: a habit certainly expresses a sort of “au-
tomatism” – we perform the acts we are accustomed to without thinking 
about them – but at the same time provides us with the ease whereby 
we perform those same acts with souplesse and naturalness. Habit is a 
“second nature”, an altera natura, as it is said in the Latin definitions of 
consuetudo or in the lexicon of the Roman jurisprudential tradition.
To highlight the topic which the essays of this dossier focus on, it is 
perhaps worthwhile to recall the philosophical lexicon of habit by evok-
ing some references that do not explicitly recur in them. In the main Eu-
ropean languages the words “habit”, “hábito”, “abitudine”, “habitude” re-
fer to the Latin habitus, which refers in turn – like the Greek term which 
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it translates, i.e. hexis – to the verb “to have” (Lat. habere; Gr. échein). The 
apparently dissonant German word “Gewohnheit” refers in fact, through 
the verb “wohnen” (“to dwell”), to the very same matrix (habere, habitus, 
habitare). In the habits that we “have” the singularity that we “are” is de-
centralized from the sovereignty of the will and appears to be irreducibly 
mediated by the set of relationships, affectivities and passions that char-
acterizes the social environment of which it has always been an integral 
part. Habits and customs expropriate the subject of its sovereignty and 
are acquired in the field of immanence of relationships and regulation 
curves that do not find either their own foundation in the subject or the 
definition and the guarantee of individual liberty in mutual isolation.
A second, equally decisive characterization must be added to this first 
one. A particular form of action is expressed as a habit. To contract a 
habit, as we saw earlier, means to repeat a sequence, but this sequence, 
once acquired, “frees” the act from the coercion that characterizes the 
process of its acquisition and enables the individual who has contracted 
the habit to make a much more flexible and spontaneous “use” of her fac-
ulties. A piano virtuoso repeats the gestures that have marked her tech-
nical learning every time she sits at her instrument, but precisely because 
they are now at her disposal, precisely because she has perfectly acquired 
them – and, therefore, she somehow “has” them – she is not just able to 
perform a score mechanically but to fully express the power of her free 
interpretation. The particular form of “having” that resonates here does 
not end in a definitive possession but establishes a virtually ever-present 
disposition that qualifies the subject as a form-of-life – in this case, be-
ing a pianist – and consequently also disables or un-determines the gap 
between necessity and freedom, between the latent faculty (being able to 
play) and its realization (playing now), between power and act.
In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle employs two terms to designate 
“habit”. The first one, ethos, corresponds to the process of contraction 
of a habit, which obviously does not coincide with a natural founda-
tion but depends on a continued exercise over time that sets in mo-
tion both somatic and cognitive components. The second one, hexis, 
to which we have already referred, indicates precisely a disposition; 
a qualitative disposition that can be indifferently ethical (habitually 
behaving generously or according to justice, for instance), cognitive (a 
mental state) or technical (the hexis whereby a single person is inclined 
to a specific form-of-life that expresses itself as a habitus: knowing 
how to play, how to build or how to think as the “second nature” of 
the musician, of the architect or of the philosopher), which is acquired 
through the repetition of experiences and is experienced as one’s fluid 
mode of belonging to oneself. A subject is not but rather has the set of 
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practices that have formed her, and stands by them as by the system of 
conventions, rules and modes of action that characterize her belonging 
to a determinate field of relations.
This determination, however, is not rigid. There is nothing mechani-
cal to it. On the contrary, it repeats itself, while differentiating and mul-
tiplying itself, precisely because the energy that repetition contains and 
reproduces does not run out and the habitual action – knowing how to 
play, once the technique has been acquired and we are trained to place our 
hands on the keyboard, to reiterate the aforementioned example – traces 
a disposition that bestows upon the subject an inexhaustible virtuality: a 
pianist – but also a philosopher, a prudent man, an architect – does not 
cease to be such when she does not play (or think, or act, or build). One 
continues to “be” the disposition towards the action that one “has”. Ga-
briel Tarde, one of Deleuze’s references, highlights how an “echologie”, i.e. 
an ontology of having and not of being, ought to be established in order to 
produce a different image of reality and politics. A “metaphysics of mutual 
possession” is the necessary premise for a sociology of the trans-individual.
Hence a series of consequences. “Custom” and “law”, two keywords 
of the Western political lexicon, can be indeed understood in a very 
different way with respect to the formalism of the modern concept of 
law. The law sterilizes action by empowering a definitive orthopedics of 
both individual and collective behavior. An action shall be called lawful 
or unlawful, acceptable or prohibited, in virtue of the sovereign deci-
sion that forestalls its executive procedures. The whole system of rela-
tionships between singularities is trapped into the formal scheme that 
constitutes it, thus enclosing it within the hierarchy of normative sour-
ces. The mechanics of the collective body – from Hobbes through the 
French revolutionary constitutionalism to modern democratic constitu-
tions – is that of an automaton. The constituent action wears out once 
the machinery of the state is organized and its project is implemented. 
The continuity between Absolutism and the French Revolution, which 
Tocqueville was the first to speak about, emerges as a logic of steriliza-
tion of customs (the logic that directs, from a historical point of view, 
the process of institutionalization of the absolutist monarchy) and as a 
neutralization of differences made possible by a geometry of action that 
translates, as in the case of Sieyès, the equality of subjects into the equi-
distance from the center, namely the Law, which guarantees their distri-
bution. There is no constituent dynamic that can be preserved, once the 
static of the constitution has been achieved. The aporias and ambiva-
lences of this logic clearly emerge in the Revolutionary threshold. This 
is what the essays dedicated to Burke and Kant, written respectively by 
Lorenzo Rustighi and Giulia Valpione, focus on.
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As always, Hegel provides a further level of complexity. Pierpaolo 
Cesaroni focuses on Hegel – a “Deleuzian” one, so to speak, and precisely 
on the premises that I mentioned earlier – to highlight how the topic of 
habit enables a definitive denaturalization of ontology. Unlike animals, 
man, the social being par excellence, has no “instincts” but a para doxically 
“institutional” nature in which she continually reweaves her bond with 
herself as well as with others. It is the modalities of such an irreducible 
“texture” that Paolo Slongo reconstructs through a Nietzschean archive 
that includes French moralists and Montaigne, aiming at a different ge-
nealogy of modern subjectivity.
A few decisive elements come into play here to outline the key mo-
tivations shared by the surveys of the history of the (political) concept 
of habit conducted in this dossier. The first one concerns the processes 
of formation of customs. A habit –as well as its political translation, i.e. 
custom– has nothing natural or necessary. To the contrary, the distinc-
tion between nature and artifice, between necessity and freedom, be-
comes indeterminate and is revoked. “We are rooted into outside things 
and melt away into them, nor can any man say he consists absolutely 
in this or that”, writes Samuel Butler in 1878. And he goes on: “We are 
no longer, so to speak, under the Law, but under Grace”.1 The use of 
oneself and of the conventions after which the self gets modeled and 
transformed commits the subject to a constant variation; it dispossesses 
her of the illusion of having a conclusive sovereignty over herself or 
an identity perfectly corresponding to the mask that modern law puts 
on her face. What the theme of habit makes available to us is a differ-
ent genealogy of subjectivation, irreducible to what Foucault called the 
“Cartesian moment” of philosophy. Moreover, the trait of innovation 
and variation that traverses the subject – when it is deformalized and 
dealt with in accordance with the process, i.e. the rhythm, that is in-
herent in it – is what the most recent neurobiology highlights when it 
engages with the question of the brain’s “plasticity”. Making the geneal-
ogy of modernity – and determining its limits, in this case – allows us to 
thematize the actuality to which we belong.
I take the liberty of introducing a further element. Not only do 
the processes of contemporary cognitive capitalism exploit and valor-
ize precisely such a “plasticity” – it makes sense to speak of biopolitics, 
I contend, only in this sense – but they are also reproduced through 
schemes of juridical regulation that only to a hasty gaze may appear to 
be the same as in the age of the modern state. What has blown up, to-
gether with the 20th-century Fordist compromise between capital and 
1 Samuel Butler. Life and Habit. Cambridge, Cambridge Universtiy Press, [1878] 2009, p. 11.
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labor, is the general device that conceived the Law as the expression of 
the general will and considered it to be the product of a national and 
unitary political representation. Much of the normative production that 
has oriented and still orients the “becoming-world of capital” – I use 
this formula to sum up in a single expression what the economic and 
political sociology of the last decades has been calling “globalization” – 
cannot be traced back to any state-based or representative origin.
It is rather made of conventions, customs and agreements that define 
a dynamic and anonymous field of regulation. The term “custom” is still 
in force and maintains an immediately normative value in common law 
countries. We may use it in a descriptive way for the purpose of under-
standing the shift from one age of the law to another, but we may also 
imagine to make a “use” of it, in the proper sense of the word, aiming to 
impose from below an instituent twist to the regulatory processes that 
characterize the contemporary age. It is probably in this sense that the 
last Deleuze spoke of the necessity to become “Romans” and to push 
(political) philosophy into meeting with jurisprudence.
It ought to be clear by now that the essays composing this dossier, 
which regard the questions raised by the late Foucault and by Deleuze 
as extremely relevant, are not motivated by archaeological intentions 
and are not subjected to the fascination of monumental history which 
the history of philosophy generally falls prey to. Nietzsche used to warn 
that the excess of history affects the “plastic force” of life. These con-
tributions, which explore a particular way in to the genealogy of mo-
dernity and summon a series of conceptual references put aside by the 
progress of the latter’s hegemonic processes (use, habit, custom, style, 
governance), linger rather over the immanence of life, including the life 
of law and institutions.
This is also with a view to finding a way out – or a breakout – from the 
steel cage in which the modern experience of politics has been enclosed.
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